We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high cost rm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , allow the conclusion that only the low cost rm will choose to commit. Hence, the low cost rm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.
Introduction
Ever since Von Stackelberg wrote his Marktform und Gleichgewicht in 1934, it has been well-known that in many duopoly situations a rm is better o when it acts as a leader than when it acts as a follower. Since each rm will strive to obtain the most favorable position for itself, the question arises which of the two duopolists will gain victory and obtain this leadership position. Von Stackelberg concluded that in general it is not possible to answer this question theoretically (Von Stackelberg, 1934, pp. 18-20) . In this paper, we consider the special case of a linear quantity setting duopoly game and show that in this case the role assignment may follow from risk considerations. Speci cally, we demonstrate that committing is less risky for a low cost rm so that such a rm will emerge as the Stackelberg leader.
Our work is inspired by an idea of Thomas Schelling. Of course, Schelling is most wellknown for his general demonstration of the value of commitment, i.e. that committing is bene cial for a player who is the only one able to make a commitment. Schelling realized that, as a consequence, all players in the game will attempt to commit themselves and that a coordination problem might arise: committing is bene cial only if the opponent does not commit, it might be (very) costly if the opponent also commits himself. This in turn implies that a player might decide not to commit himself since he fears that the opponent might commit as well and since the costs associated with the resulting \Stack-elberg war" might be too high (Schelling, 1960, p. 39) . Hence, there is a fundamental trade-o between exibility and commitment. Schelling pointed out this trade-o , but he did not provide a formal analysis of it, he did not solve the game. Our aim in this paper is to provide a full solution for the linear 2-person duopoly game.
We consider a quantity setting duopoly game with linear demand and constant marginal cost. One rm is more e cient, i.e. has lower marginal cost, than the other.
The formal model used to analyze the trade-o between commitment and exibility is the 2-stage action commitment game from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . The rules are as follows. Each duopolist has to move (i.e. to choose a quantity) in one of two periods; choices are simultaneous, but, if one player chooses to move early while the other moves late, the latter is informed about the rst-mover's choice before making his decision. Hence, moving early is pro table if one is the only player to do so, but it is costly if the other commits as well. This timing game has several equilibria, in particular, each of the Stackelberg outcomes of the underlying duopoly game is an equilibrium. As Hamilton and Slutsky pointed out, these are the only pure undominated equilibria of the game. We select the solution of the game by using the risk-dominance concept from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . This concept allows one to quantify the risks involved with the two candidate solutions and, hence, it enables to resolve the trade-o s. Risk considerations show that committing is less risky for the rm that has the lower marginal cost. This safer equilibrium in which the low cost rm moves rst is the neutral focal point and, adopting the risk dominance concept, the players will coordinate on it.
Some intuition for this result might be obtained by looking at the 2 2 game in which each player is restricted to use one of two strategies: either to commit himself to his Stackelberg leader quantity or to wait till the second period and then best respond to the quantity chosen by the opponent, with players choosing their Cournot quantities in the second period if neither player moved in the rst period. (See Table 1 in Section 3 for the payo matrix.) Both Stackelberg outcomes appear as strict equilibria in this game and it is well-known that risk dominance allows a simple characterization for such 2 2 games: the equilibrium with the highest (Nash) product of the deviation losses is the risk dominant one. (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, Lemma 5.4.4) . In Section 3 we show that the equilibrium where the low cost rm commits is risk dominant in this reduced game. The intuition is that, if player 1 has higher marginal costs, then his reaction curve is below the reaction curve of player 2, so that his Stackelberg and Nash quantities are closer together, which implies that he can gain less from committing himself than player 2 can. On the other hand, player 1 incurs greater losses than player 2 does if both players commit themselves. As a consequence, player 1 is in a weaker bargaining position to push for his most favored outcome and he will lose the battle.
If the risk-dominance relation between our two candidate solutions could always be decided on the basis of the 2 2 game spanned by them, then our problem could be solved by straightforward computation. Unfortunately, the problem posed in this paper is not that simple to solve and the above mentioned characterization of risk dominance is of limited use for the problem addressed. In our \action commitment" game, a player has in nitely many strategies available; the choice is not simply between committing to the Stackelberg leader quantity and waiting. Furthermore, it is known that, in general, the reduced 2 2 game spanned by the two equilibrium candidates may capture the overall risk situation rather badly. Consequently, to nd the solution of the game, there is no recourse but to apply risk dominance to the overall game. Now risk dominance is de ned by means of the tracing procedure and the fact that this procedure is rather complex and di cult to handle forces us to restrict ourselves to the linear case. Even in this most simple linear case, the computations are already rather involved, they become very cumbersome in the more general case. Nevertheless, the main result of this paper is that risk dominance indeed selects the equilibrium in which the low cost rm leads.
The present paper is part of a small, but growing, literature that aims at endogenizing the rst mover in oligopoly models. Ours is the rst paper in which a speci c Stackelberg outcome is derived from a model in which the duopolists are in symmetric positions ex ante and in which only endogenous (strategic) uncertainty is present. Related papers either put rms in asymmetric positions to start with, or add exogenous uncertainty (about production costs or market demand), or admit multiple equilibrium outcomes. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) consider the same game as we do and they show that the two Stackelberg equilibria are the only pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies. Hence, they conclude that a Stackelberg outcome will result but they cannot tell which one. Sadanand and Sadanand (1996) analyze the same model when rms face demand uncertainty, which is resolved before production in the second stage. (Also see Sadanand and Green (1991) .) There is always a symmetric (Cournot) equilibrium: both rms move late when uncertainty is large and early when there is no uncertainty. In addition, both Stackelberg outcomes can be sustained as equilibria provided that uncertainty is not too large. Hence, to select a unique Stackelberg outcome it is necessary to assume that uncertainty in uences the duopolists in an asymmetric way. An interesting asymmetric variant that Sadanand and Sadanand analyze is a large rm versus fringe model. Since each fringe rm individually is too small to in uence output, the unique equilibrium now has the large rm committing itself, while the small rms remain exible. Spencer and Brander (1992) study a similar duopoly model with demand uncertainty. However, they assume that a rm who moves early is informed about the time at which the opponent moves, which simpli es the analysis considerably. For example, when both rms decide to move early, it follows that they will produce Cournot quantities. In a symmetric setting, both rms will move early (resp. late) when uncertainty is low (resp. high), so that in each case a Cournot outcome results. A Stackelberg outcome may result when rms are in asymmetric positions: when one rm is much better informed about the exogenous shock than the other, then the better informed rm may emerge as the Stackelberg leader. A di erent type of asymmetry is considered in Kambhu (1984) : one rm is risk neutral and the other is risk averse. In this case, the risk neutral rm may arise as the Stackelberg leader. Mailath (1993) puts the rms in asymmetric starting positions. One rm is informed about demand, while the other faces uncertainty and only the informed rm has the option to move rst. In the unique \intuitive" equilibrium the informed rm indeed acts as a Stackelberg leader, even if it could earn higher ex ante pro ts by choosing quantities simultaneously with the uninformed rm. Saloner (1987) considers a model related to the one discussed here in which also two periods of production are allowed. Firms simultaneously choose quantities in the rst period; these become common knowledge and then rms simultaneously decide how much more to produce in the second period before the market clears. Saloner shows that any outcome on the outer envelope of the two reaction functions lying inbetween the two Stackelberg outcomes can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Ellingsen (1995) notes that only the two Stackelberg outcomes survive iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies in this game. Pal (1991) The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The underlying duopoly game as well as the action commitment game from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) are described in Section 2, where also relevant notation is introduced. Section 3 describes the speci cs of the tracing procedure as it applies in this context and de nes the concept of risk dominance. The main results are derived in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
The underlying linear quantity-setting duopoly game is as follows. There are two rms, 1 and 2. Firm i produces quantity q i at a constant marginal cost c i 0. The market price is linear, p = maxf0; a?q 1 ?q 2 g. Firms choose quantities simultaneously and the pro t of rm i is given by u i (q 1 ; q 2 ) = (p?c i )q i . We assume that 3c i ?2c j a (i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6 2 j), which implies that a Stackelberg follower will not be driven out of the market. We will restrict ourselves to the case where rm 2 is more e cient than rm 1, c 1 > c 2 . We write a i = a ? c i .
The best reply of player j against the quantity q i of player i is unique and is given by b j (q i ) = maxf0; (a j ? q i )=2g:
The unique maximizer of the function q i 7 ! u i (q i ; b j (q i )) is denoted by q L i ( rms i's Stackelberg leader quantity). We also write q F j for the quantity that j will choose as a As is well-known
hence, each player has an incentive to commit himself.
To investigate which player will dare to commit himself when both players have the opportunity to do so, we make use of the two-period action commitment game that was proposed in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . The rules are as follows. There are two periods and each player has to choose a quantity in exactly one of these periods. Within a period, choices are simultaneous, but, if a player does not choose to move in period 1, then in period 2 this player is informed about which action his opponent chose in period 1. This game has proper subgames at t = 2 and our assumptions imply that all of these have unique equilibria. We will analyze the reduced game, g 2 , that results when these subgames are replaced by their equilibrium values. Formally, the strategy set of player i in g 2 is I R + fW i g, where W i denotes i's strategy to wait till period 2, and the payo function is given by
It is easily seen that g 2 has three Nash equilibria in pure strategies: Either each player i commits to his Nash quantity q N i in the rst period, or one player i commits to his Stackelberg leader quantity q L i and the other player waits till the second period. One also notices (with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) ) that the rst (Cournot) equilibrium is in weakly dominated strategies (committing to q N i is dominated by W i in g 2 ), hence, one expects that only the (Stackelberg) equilibria in which players move in di erent periods are viable. Below we will indeed show that the Cournot equilibrium is risk dominated by both Stackelberg equilibria (Proposition 1). It should be noted that besides these pure equilibria, the game g 2 admits several mixed equilibria as well. These mixed equilibria will not be considered in this paper, the reason being that we want to stick as closely as possible to the general solution procedure outlined in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , a procedure that gives precedence to pure equilibria whenever possible.
Although mixed strategy equilibria will not be considered, we stress that mixed strategies will play an important role in what follows. The reason is that, in the case at hand, a player will typically be uncertain about whether the opponent will commit or not, and such uncertaintly about the opponent's behavior can be expressed by a mixed strategy. Let m j be a mixed strategy of player j in the game g 2 . Because of the linear-quadratic speci cation of the game, there are only three \characteristics" of m j that are relevant to player i, viz. w j the probability that player j waits, j the average quantity to which j commits himself given that he commits himself, and j , the variance of this quantity. Speci cally, it easily follows from (2.6)-(2.9) that the expected payo of player i against a mixed strategy m j with characteristics (w j ; j ; j ) is given by u i (q i ; m j ) = (1 ? w j )(a i ? q i ? j )q i + w j (2a i ? a j ? q i )q i =2 (2.10) u i (W i ; m j ) = (1 ? w j )((a i ? j ) 2 =4 + j =4) + w j (2a i ? a j ) 2 =9 (2.11) Note that uncertainty concerning the quantity to which j will commit himself makes it more attractive for player i to wait: j contributes positively to (2.11) and it does not play a role in (2.10). On the other hand, increasing w j or decreasing j increases the incentive for player i to commit himself.
Risk Dominance and the Tracing Procedure
The concept of risk dominance captures the intuitive idea that, when players do not know which of two equilibria should be played, they will measure the risk involved in playing each of these equilibria and they will coordinate expectations on the less risky one, i.e. on the risk dominant equilibrium of the pair. The formal de nition of risk dominance involves the bicentric prior and the tracing procedure. The bicentric prior describes the players' initial assessment about the situation. The tracing procedure is a process that, starting from some given prior beliefs of the players, gradually adjusts the players' plans and expectations until they are in equilibrium. It models the thought process of players who, by deductive personal re ection, try to gure out what to play in the situation where the initial uncertainty is represented by the given prior. Below we describe the mechanisms of the tracing procedure as well as how, according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , the initial prior should be constructed.
First, however, we recall that risk dominance allows a very simple characterization for 2 2 games with two Nash equilibria: the risk dominant equilibrium is that one for which the product of the deviation losses is largest. Consequently, if risk dominance could always be decided on the basis of the reduced game spanned by the two equilibria under consideration (and if the resulting relation would be transitive), then the solution could be found by straightforward computations. Unfortunately, this happy state of a airs does not prevail in general. The two concepts do not always generate the same solution and it is well-known that the Nash product of the deviation losses may be a bad description of the underlying risk situation in general. (See, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for a simple example.) In our companion paper (van Damme and Hurkens, 1998) we show that also in duopoly games the two concepts may yield di erent solutions. In the present case, however, the two concepts do generate the same solutions. Since the calculations based on the reduced game are easily performed we do these rst.
Consider, rst of all, the reduced game spanned by the Cournot equilibrium (q N 1 ; q N 2 ) and by the Stackelberg equilibrium (q L 1 ; W 2 ) in which rm 1 leads. In this 2 2 game, W 2 weakly dominates q N 2 , hence, the product of the deviation losses associated with the Cournot equilibrium is zero and, in the reduced game, the Stackelberg equilibrium is risk dominant. Exactly the same argument establishes that the Cournot equilibrium is risk dominated by the Stackelberg equilibrium in which rm 2 leads. Next, consider the reduced game where each player is restricted to either committing himself to his Stackelberg quantity or to wait, which is given in Fig. 1 which holds since a 1 < a 2 . Hence, the product of the deviation losses is largest at the equilibrium where the e cient rm 2 leads: risk considerations based on reduced game analysis unambiguously point into the direction of the Stackelberg equilibrium where the low cost rm leads. As already argued, there is, however, no guarantee that this shortcut indeed identi es the risk dominant equilibrium of the overall game. The only way to nd out is by fully solving the entire game. This we do in the next section. In the remainder of this section, we formally de ne the concepts involved.
Let g = (S 1 ; S 2 ; u 1 ; u 2 ) be a 2-person game and let m i be a mixed strategy of player i in g (i = 1; 2). The strategy m i represents the initial uncertainty of player j about i's behavior. For t 2 0; 1] we de ne the game g t;m = (S 1 ; S 2 ; u t;m 1 ; u t;m 2 ) in which the payo functions are given by u t;m i (s i ; s j ) = (1 ? t)u i (s i ; m j ) + tu i (s i ; s j ):
Hence, for t = 1, this game g t;m coincides with the original game g, while for t = 0 we have a trivial game in which each player's payo depends only on his own action and his own prior beliefs. Write ? m for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e. In this paper we will apply the tracing procedure to the in nite game g 2 that was described in the previous section. To our knowledge, ours is the rst application of these ideas to a game with a continuum of strategies. For such games, no generalizations of the Schanuel et al. (1991) results have been established yet, but as we will see in the following sections, there indeed exists a unique distinguished curve in the special case analyzed here. Hence, the non-niteness of the game g 2 will create no special problems.
It remains to specify the players' initial beliefs when they are uncertain about which of two equilibria of g, s or s 0 , should be played. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue as follows. Player j, being Bayesian, will assign a subjective probability z j to i playing s i and he will assign the complementary probability z 0 j = 1 ? z j to i playing s 0 i . With these beliefs, player j will play a best response against the strategy z j s i +z 0 j s 0 i that he expects i to play. Assume that j chooses all best responses with equal probability and denote the resulting strategy of j with b j (z j ). Player i does not know the beliefs z j of player j and applying the principle of insu cient reason he considers z j to be uniformly distributed on 0; 1]. Writing Z j for a uniformly distributed random variable on 0; 1], player i will, therefore, believe that he is facing the mixed strategy m j = b j (Z j ) (3.4) and this mixed strategy m j of player j is player i's prior belief about j's behavior in the situation at hand. Similarly, m i = b i (Z i ), where Z 1 and Z 2 are independent, is the prior belief of player j, and the mixed strategy pair m = (m 1 ; m 2 ) is called the bicentric prior associated with the pair (s; s 0 ). Given this bicentric prior m, we say that s risk dominates s 0 if s 1;m = s, where s 1;m is the linear trace of m. In case the outcome of the tracing procedure is an equilibrium di erent from s or s 0 , then neither of the equilibria risk dominates the other. Such a situation will, however, not occur in our 2-stage action commitment game, provided that the costs of the rms are di erent.
Commitment and Risk Dominance
In this section, we prove our main results. Let g 2 be the endogenous commitment game from Section 2. Write S i for the pure equilibrium in which player i commits to his Stackelberg leader quantity in period 1, S i = (q L i ; W j ), and write C for the equilibrium in which each player commits to his Cournot quantity in period 1, C = (q N 1 ; q N 2 ). We show that both Stackelberg equilibria risk dominate the Cournot equilibrium and that S 2 risk dominates S 1 when c 2 < c 1 . The rst result is quite intuitive: Committing to q N i is a weakly dominated strategy and playing a weakly dominated strategy is risky. The proof of this result is correspondingly easy. Proposition 1 . In g 2 , the Stackelberg equilibrium S i risk dominates the Cournot equilibrium C (i = 1; 2).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we just prove that S 1 risk dominates C. We rst compute the bicentric prior that is relevant for this risk comparison, starting with the prior beliefs of player 1.
Let player 2 believe that 1 plays z 2 S 11 + (1 ? z 2 )C 1 = z 2 q L 1 + (1 ? z 2 )q N 1 . Obviously, if z 2 2 (0; 1), then the best response of player 2 is to wait. Hence, the prior belief of player 1 is that player 2 will wait with probability 1, m 2 = W 2 . Next, let player 1 believe that 2 plays z 1 S 12 +(1?z 1 )C 2 = z 1 W 2 +(1?z 1 )q N 2 . Obviously, waiting yields player 1 the Nash payo N 1 as in (2.3), irrespective of the value of z 1 . When z 1 > 0 then committing to a quantity that is (slightly) above q N 1 yields a strictly higher payo , hence, the best response is to commit to a certain quantity q 1 (z 1 ). The reader easily veri es that q 1 (z 1 ) increases with z 1 and that q 1 (1) = q L 1 . Consequently, if m 1 is the prior belief of player 2 then for the characteristics (w 1 ; 1 ; 1 ) of m 1 we have: w 1 = 0; 1 > q N 1 ; 1 > 0. Now, let us turn to the tracing procedure. The starting point corresponds to the best replies against the prior. Obviously, the unique best response against m 2 is for player 1 to commit to q L 1 , while player 2's unique best response against m 1 is to wait. Hence, the unique equilibrium at t = 0 is S 1 . Since S 1 is an equilibrium of the original game, it is an equilibrium for any t 2 0; 1]. Consequently, the distinguished curve in the graph ? m is the curve f(t; S 1 ) : t 2 0; 1]g and S 1 risk dominates C.
2
We now turn to the risk comparison of the two Stackelberg equilibria. Again we start by computing the bicentric prior based on S 1 and S 2 . Let player j believe that i commits to q L i with probability z and that i waits with probability 1 ? z. From Given z, the optimal commitment quantity q j (z) of player j is given by q j (z) = (a j ? a i )=2 + a j =2(1 + z); These inequalities already give some intuition for why committing is more risky for player 1: he attaches a smaller probability to the opponent waiting, he expects the opponent to commit to a larger quantity on average, and he is more uncertain about the quantity to which the opponent commits himself. All three aspects contribute positively to making waiting a more attractive strategy.
In the next Lemma we show that actually waiting is a dominant strategy for rm 1 at the start of the tracing procedure whenever the cost di erential is su ciently large. Write j = a i a j (4 3 ), the derivative of the LHS of (4.13) (with respect to j ) is larger than the derivative of the RHS of (4.13), hence, the result follows.
In the next Lemma we show that, in contrast to the previous result, the most e cient rm's best response to the prior is always to commit. Lemma 2 Write m 0 1 for the prior strategy of player 1 as given by (4.7). Then u 2 (m 0 1 ; W 2 ) < max q 2 u 2 (m 0 1 ; q 2 ).
Proof. Substituting (4.12) into (4.11) yields the optimal payo that player i can get by .9) and (4.10). Note that z 1 is a function of 1 , so that (as appearing in (4.14)) can be viewed as a function of 1 only. A direct computation shows that (1) > 0, hence, player 2 prefers to commit when the costs are equal. In the appendix we show that 0; z 0; and z 0 (4.15) from which it follows that committing becomes more attractive for player 2 when his cost advantage increases. Consequently, rm 2 nds it optimal to commit against the prior for all parameter constellations.
The Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the Stackelberg equilibrium with rm 2 as leader is the (unique) equilibrium at the start of the tracing procedure when z 2 1 2 . It, hence, is an equilibrium of g t for any value of t and, therefore Corollary 1 If the di erence in costs is su ciently large (speci cally, if z 2 1 2 ), then the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the e cient rm leads risk dominates the other Stackelberg equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section, we will con ne attention to the case where the cost di erence is small enough so that also for the ine cient rm 1 the best response to the prior involves a commitment. So from now on z 2 < 1 2 . 2 The next Lemma shows that it cannot be true that both rms keep on committing themselves to the end of the tracing procedure: at least one of the rms has to switch. The Lemma thereafter will then show that it is the weakest rm that switches rst, which implies that the outcome will always be leadership of the strong rm. Lemma 3 Let s t be the equilibrium on the path of the tracing procedure at \time" t if the players priors are as in (4.7). Then there exists i 2 f1; 2g and t < 1 such that s t i = W i .
Proof. Assume not, so that each player nds it optimal to commit at each point reached by the tracing path. Writing q t i for the optimal commitment quantity of player i at time t, it is easily seen that q 1 i = q N i for i = 1; 2, since the payo functions at t = 1 coincide with those of the original game. Furthermore, q t i > q N i for t < 1 since any quantity less than a N i is strictly dominated by waiting. Write u t i for the payo function at \time" t when the prior is given by (4.7) and let g i (t) = u t i ( Furthermore, the partial derivative with respect to q j is equal to ?q N i + (a i ? q N j )=2 = 0 so that g 0 i (1) > 0 and g i (t) < 0 for some t < 1. But this contradicts our assumption that it is optimal to commit for each player for any value of t < 1. 2
Our strategy for proving that it is the weakest rm that switches rst is to show that this rm will switch rst even when the more e cient rm is more`pessimistic'. Specically, we will show that even when the e cient rm believes that the other commits with the same probability as it itself does, the ine cient rm will switch before. Speci cally, write m j for the prior strategy of player j as given by (4.6) and write m j for the strategy de ned similarly, but with z 1 replaced by z 2 . Let m = (m 1 ; m 2 ) and m = ( m 1 ; m 2 ). Hence, player 2 is more pessimistic in m, while player 1's prior beliefs are the same in m and m. (Recall from (4.5) that z 1 < z 2 .) Assume that each player nds it optimal to commit at t = 0 when the prior is m. Write q t;m i (q j ) for the best commitment quantity of player i at t when the opponent commits to q j at that time and denote the (unique) pair of mutual best commitment quantities by (q t 1 ; q t 2 ). Write g t i (q i ; q j ) = u t;m i (q i ; q j ) ? u t;m i (W i ; q j ): (4.17) then g t i (q t i ; q t j ) > 0 (1 = 1; 2) for t su ciently small and (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) is the equilibrium on the tracing path for such t. De ne ( q t 1 ; q t 2 ) and g t i similarly, but with m replaced by m in the above de nitions. We now have Lemma 4 Let t i = supf 2 0; 1] : g t i (q t i ; q t j ) 0 for all t 2 0; ]g. Then t 2 > t 1 .
Proof. We only provide a sketch of the proof here and relegate technical details to the Appendix. The proof consists of comparing the tracing path (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) with the tracing path ( q t 1 ; q t 2 ). We rst show that q t 2 < q t 2 and q t 1 q t 1 . These inequalities are intuitive: player 2 is more pessimistic if the prior is m, hence, he will commit to a lower quantity. This in turn gives player 2 an incentive to commit to a higher quantity when the prior is m. Furthermore, if player 2 is more pessimistic, then he nds committing himself less attractive: g t 2 g t 2 . Still, since rm 2 has lower cost than rm 1 has, committing is more attractive for rm 2 than for rm 1 when both rms are equally pessimistic: g t 1 < g t 2 . The result follows by combining the above observations. Formally then, in the Appendix we establish the following inequalities: g t 1 (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) = g t 1 (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) (1) g t 1 (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) (2) g t 1 ( q t 1 ; q t 2 )
< g t 2 ( q t 1 ; q t 2 ) (4) g t 2 (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) (5) g t 2 (q t 1 ; q t 2 ) (6) g t 2 (q t 1 ; q t 2 ): (4.18) (The rst equality holds since player i's prior is the same in both cases; the rst and fourth inequality follow from the monotonicity of the quantities; the second and sixth inequality follow from the best response properties, and the fth inequality follows since player 2 is more pessimistic when the prior is m.) 2
Lemma 4 implies that at t = t 1 the tracing path reaches the equilibrium (q t 1 1 ; q t 1 2 ), with player 1 being actually indi erent between waiting and committing to q t 1 1 . The tracing path must now continue along an interval I (with t 1 2 I) with equilibria of the form (m 1 (t); q I 2 (t)), where player 2 commits to q I 2 (t) and player 1 uses a mixed strategy: he waits with probability w(t) and commits to q I 1 (t) with the complementary probability 1?w(t). The two commitment quantities are determined by the optimality condition for player 1 (q I 1 (t) must be the optimal commitment quantity) and the indi erence condition for player 1 (committing optimally yields the same payo as waiting). The probability of waiting, w(t), is determined by the optimality condition for player 2. Fig. 2 illustrates the argumentation: Time t is on the horizontal axis, rm 2's commitment quantity on the vertical axis. The Figure contains three curves. Curve q C plots the commitment strategy of rm 2 when rm 1 commits for sure and play is in equilibrium. As we established in Lemma 4, both rms keep committing from t = 0 to t = t 1 , therefore the tracing path follows this curve upto t = t 1 . Curve q I plots rm 2's commitment quantity that leaves rm 1 exactly indi erent between committing and waiting. The tracing path has to continue along this curve from t = t 1 . (In the Appendix we establish that the curve necessarily bends backwards.) Curve q W describes the optimal commitment quantity when rm 1 waits with probability 1. The tracing path follows this curve from t = t 0 to t = 1. It follows that the endpoint of the tracing path is the equilibrium where player 2 leads, hence, we have shown Proposition 2 The Stackelberg equilibrium in which the low cost rm leads risk dominates the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the e cient rm follows.
By combining the Propositions 1 and 2 we, therefore, obtain our main result:
Theorem 1 The Stackelberg equilibrium in which the e cient rm leads and the inefcient rm follows is the risk dominant equilibrium of the endogenous quantity commitment game.
Furthermore, as a Corollary we immediately have that the shortcut via the reduced games, as taken in Section 3, indeed correctly identi ed the risk dominant equilibrium of the overall game. Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium that is selected is the one with the highest produced quantity (hence, the lowest price) and the highest total pro ts. So, in this case, the selected equilibrium is the one where both the producer and the consumer surplus are highest. of a comparison of the Nash products of the deviation losses yields the same answer. However, as already said, there is no guarantee for this to happen in general and in our companion paper van Damme and Hurkens (1998) we show that the two concepts yield di erent solutions in a price setting context. In that paper we analyze endogenous price leadership in a linear market for di erentiated products. Again, we assume that rms di er in their marginal costs and we show that the e cient rm is the leader in the risk dominant equilibrium. In this case, however, that equilibrium has a smaller Nash product than the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the ine cient rm leads. Quite interestingly, if the cost di erential is su ciently small, the ine cient rm has higher pro ts than the e cient rm in the risk dominant equilibrium: It pro ts from free riding as a follower.
Although Von Stackelberg (1934) argued that in general it is not possible to determine theoretically which of the duopolists will become the leader (\Es is jedoch theoretisch nicht zu entscheiden, welcher der beiden Dyopolisten obsiegen wird", p. 20), he also provides a numerical example for which he does determine the actual leader. The example is given by p = 10 ? Q=100; c 1 = 2; c 2 = 1:5; F 1 = 500; F 2 = 600;
where F i is the (unavoidable) xed costs of rm i. Von Stackelberg argues that in this case rm 2 (which is the one with the lower marginal cost) will most likely become the market leader since it makes less losses than rm 1 in the case of Stackelberg warfare: We have q L 1 = 375; q L 2 = 450; D 1 = ?593:75; D 2 = ?487:50. Hence, rm 2 makes less losses during the price war and, therefore, it can win the war of attrition. Of course, this argument is entirely di erent from the one developed in this paper. Von Stackelberg also remarks that actually this outcome is quite natural and follows from the model's assumption that the second rm is a more modern one which has higher xed costs, but lower marginal cost. 4 This last comment is very intriguing since, if the modern rm would have substantially higher xed costs, exactly the same argument would imply that the old-fashioned rm would become the leader.
Note that we did not provide the solution of the endogenous timing game for the case where both rms have the same marginal cost. The reader might conjecture that in that case the Cournot equilibrium would be selected, however, Lemma 3 shows that that conjecture is wrong. If the outcome of the tracing procedure at t = 1 would be (q N 1 ; q N 2 ), then each player would strictly prefer to wait at t < 1, but clearly (W 1 ; W 2 ) cannot be an equilibrium at such t. It follows that, in the symmetric case, the outcome must be a mixed strategy equilibrium. (It obviously must be a symmetric equilibrium as well.) Since mixed equilibria have received almost no attention in the oligopoly literature, we refrain from providing the explicit solution of the symmetric game. Let us note, however, that also in the case where the costs di er, the endogenous timing game has a variety of mixed strategy equilibria. We did not take these into consideration since the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) equilibrium selection theory allows us to neglect them. That theory gives precedence to pure equilibria whenever these exist and we did consider all pure equilibria in this paper.
In this paper we only allowed for one point in time where the players can commit themselves, however, one can easily de ne the game g t in which there are (t ? 1)-periods in which the players can commit themselves. (g 1 = g; g 2 is as in (2.6) { (2.9) and g t is de ned by induction for t 3.) Knowing the solution of g 2 , the game g t , with t 3, can be solved by backward induction, i.e. by applying the subgame consistency principle from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) : No matter what the history has been, a subgame g has to be played according to its solution. Adopting this principle, one sees that in g 3 waiting is a dominant strategy of player 2: If he waits he can best respond if the opponent commits, while he is guaranteed his Stackelberg leader payo if the other waits wird warscheinlich die Unternehmung A der Underlegene sein, weil sie den gr o eren Verlust erleidet. Dies entspricht auch der Konstruktion unseres Beispiels, in welchem f ur B ein modernerer Betrieb (h ohere xe Kosten, daf ur niedriger proportionaler Satz) angenommen wurde." (Von Stackelberg, 1934, p. 66). as well. Consequently, player 2 will wait and committing becomes a riskless strategy for player 1. Hence, the solution of g 3 is that player 1 will commit itself. In other words, player 1 commits in order to prevent that player 2 will commit himself. We come to the conclusion that the predicted outcome is very sensitive to the number of commitment periods: If t is even, the solution of g t is (W 1 ; q L 2 ) while, if t 3 is odd, the solution of g t is (q L 1 ; W 2 ). In our opinion, this lack of robustness re ects the fact that the discrete time model with t 3 is not an appropriate one to model commitment possibilities. In future work we plan to investigate the issue in continuous time, while possibly also allowing for commitments to be built up gradually. For earlier work along this direction, we refer to Spence (1979) and to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) .
where the last inequality follows from z 1 = 2 . This completes the proof of the inequalities (4.16) and, therefore, of Lemma 2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We will prove the inequalities from (4.19) in the following order: First (1) and (4), next (5) and nally (3). Note that the inequalities (2) and (6) hold by de nition: q t 1 (resp. q t 2 ) is the optimal commitment quantity against q t 2 (resp. q t 1 ) in the game g t (resp. g t ). Furthermore, the equality in (4.16) holds since player 1 has the same prior in g as in g. (4) and, as both sides of this inequality are linear in t, it su ces to check that the inequality holds at both endpoints. Now, at t = 0 the inequality simpli es to a 1 ln(1 + x) < a 2 which holds since a 1 a 2 . At t = 1, the inequality simpli es to q 1 < a 1 (1 + x) and this holds because of our restrictions on the parameters. (Recall that these restrictions are without loss of generality: player 1 will not commit to a quantity that is larger than the Stackelberg leader quantity and if z 2 1 = 2 then Lemma 1 applies.) Since z 1 < z 2 (cf. (4.8)), Claim 1 implies that player 2's best response quantity is lower in g t; m than it is in g t;m . Since player 1 has the same best response correspondence in these two games, it follows that player 2 (resp. player 1) commits to a lower (resp. higher) quantity in g t; m than in g t;m . (Formally, if t min(t 1 ; t 2 ), then the map q 2 ! q t;m 2 q t;m 1 (q 2 ) is increasing and cuts the 45 -degree line at a point lower than the one where the rst graph cuts the diagonal.) Hence, Claim 1 establishes that for t < 1: q t 1 < q t 1 and q t 2 > q t 2 :
PROOF OF THE INEQUALITIES (1) AND
The proof of the inequalities (1) and (4) can now be completed by showing that the gain from committing is decreasing in the opponent's quantity. Because of the linearity of the payo function in t it su ces to show that this holds for t = 1, i. In the relevant range where both players nd it optimal to commit themselves (t min(t 1 ; t 2 )) we have q i q N i for i = 1; 2, and, therefore ?q i + (a i ? q j )=2 0;
which completes the inequalities (1) and (4).
PROOF OF INEQUALITY (5)
We have that The second integrand is clearly nonnegative. The rst is nonnegative since q 2 q N 2 . This establishes inequality (5).
PROOF OF INEQUALITY (3)
The proof involves some straightforward, but tedious calculations. For simplicity, write x = z 2 . Because of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 we may con ne ourselves to the case where x < 1 = 2 . For x 1 = 2 ; (t; x) is concave in t so that the minimum is attained in t = 0 or t = 1. Now direct substitution yields (0; x) = (x + 1)(x ? 2)(?2x ? 1) + 6(x 2 ? 1) ln(1 + x) ? 6(1 + x) ln 2 (1 + x)
Using the fact that ln(1 + x) x, we obtain (0; x) (x + 1)(x ? 2)(?2x ? 1) ? 6(1 ? x 2 )x ? 6(1 + x)x 2 = (x + 1)(2 ? 3x ? 2x 2 ) > 0 Another direct substitution gives (1 + x) (1; x) = 9x ? 6(1 + x) ln(1 + x) 3x(1 ? 2x) > 0;
where we again have used that ln(1 + x) x. Consequently (t; x) > 0 for all t and x, which completes the proof of inequality (3).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We rst recall that in g t;m 0 the optimal commitment quantity against q j is q t;m 0 i (q j ) = (1 ? t)(a i ? a j =2 + z j (a j =2 ? j )) + t(a i ? q j ) 1 + t + (1 ? t)z j (A.1) Let q C 1 (t) and q C 2 (t) be optimal commitment quantities against each other. Using (A.1) (applied to q C i (t)) we can rewrite it as q t;m 0 i (q j ) = ?t(a i ? q C j (t)) + q C i (t)(1 + t + (1 ? t)z i ) + t(a i ? q j ) 1 + t + (1 ? t)z j (A.2)
For t 2 (0; 1), let q I 2 (t) denote the commitment quantity of rm 2 that leaves rm 1 indi erent between committing optimally (to q I 1 (t)) and waiting. We know from previous analysis that rm 1 strictly prefers committing to waiting when rm 2 commits to q C 2 (t), for all t < t 1 . Moreover, the gain from committing is decreasing in the opponent's commitment strategy. Hence, the curve q I 2 (t) intersects the curve q C 2 (t) from above at t = t 1 . (See Fig. 2 .)
The tracing path must continue along the curve q I 2 (t) for some time. We need to establish the direction. On the tracing path it must hold that q I 2 (t) is the best reply against rm 1's strategy of waiting with probability w(t) 0 and committing with the remaining probability to q I 1 (t). It is easily established that the optimal commitment strategy of rm 2 is increasing in w(t) (keeping rm 1's quantity xed). So q I 2 (t) q t;m 0 2 (q I 1 (t)). Using (A.2) this is equivalent to
(1 + t + (1 ? t)z 1 )q I 2 (t) ?t(a 2 ? q C 1 (t)) + q C 2 (t)(1 + t + (1 ? t)z 2 ) + t(a 2 ? q I 1 (t)):
Multiplying both sides by 1 + t + (1 ? t)z 2 and using (A.2) once more, this is equivalent to (1 + t + (1 ? t)z 2 )(1 + t + (1 ? t)z 1 )q I 2 (t) q C 1 (t)t(1 ? t)(z 2 ? z 1 ) + q C 2 (t)((1 + t + (1 ? t)z 2 ) 2 ? t 2 ) + t 2 q I 2 (t); which, since z 2 > z 1 , implies that q I 2 (t) q C 2 (t):
This implies that the tracing path must bend backwards.
